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We develop a VAR that allows the estimation of the impact of monetary policy shocks6
on volatility. Estimates for the US suggest that an increase in the policy rate by 1% is7
associated with a rise in unemployment and inflation volatility of about 15%. Using a8
New Keynesian model, with search and matching labour frictions and Epstein-Zin prefer-9
ences we show that these volatility effects are driven by the coexistence of agents’ fears of10
unemployment and concerns about the (in) ability of the monetary authority to reverse11
deviations from the policy rule with the impact magnified by the agents’ preferences.12
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1 Introduction18
Uncertainty shocks can cause business cycle fluctuations and drive policy, but policy changes19
themselves can lead to change in uncertainty. This paper investigates empirically and the-20
oretically to what extent monetary policy shocks can affect the volatility of macroeconomic21
variables. It finds an important transmission channel from monetary policy to endogenous22
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uncertainty, both in the data and using a model where households react to the the anticipated23
risk of long unemployment spells. Using a structural VAR with stochastic volatility (extended24
to allow for feedback from the endogenous variables to the volatility), we show that monetary25
policy shocks increase macroeconomic volatility and the results are robust across identification26
schemes. It is also shown here that the monetary policy shock is responsible for about 40%27
to 50% of the forecast error variance contribution of all level shocks to the volatility of the28
endogenous variables. These volatility contributions are substantially higher than monetary29
policy shock’s shares of explaining the level series (as it is commonly found in the literature30
and illustrated again here).31
To understand how volatility is affected when monetary authorities decide to deviate unex-32
pectedly from their Taylor type reaction function, we employ a stylised New Keynesian DSGE33
model, with search & matching labour frictions and Epstein-Zin preferences. The model is34
estimated using limited information impulse response matching techniques. Although the lit-35
erature has questioned the ability of “simple” search and matching New Keynesian models to36
jointly replicate the dynamics of both unemployment and inflation (Krause and Lubik (2007)37
and Gertler et al. (2008)), our estimated model reproduces VAR responses remarkably well.38
Simulations from the theoretical model suggest that the transmission of the policy shock to39
volatility depends on three modelling features: (i) the presence of labour market real frictions,40
(ii) the monetary authorities’ desire for gradual policy adjustments and (iii) the existence of41
Epstein-Zin preferences. It is the coexistence of agents’ fears about being prolonged unemploy-42
ment and policymakers’ preference for interest rate smoothing that causes volatility to increase43
significantly. It is only in this scenario that Epstein-Zin preferences have a quantitatively mean-44
ingful role. From an economic point of view, households acknowledge the real risk of becoming45
unemployed and the fact that during the unemployment spells additional adverse shock may46
occur. However, it is the combination of these risks together with the policy-rate smoothing47
parameter that causes monetary policy to have significant volatility effects and not the shock48
per-se. In other words, agents are not overly concerned that authorities are able to deviate49
unexpectedly from their objective function but they significantly price the fact that the central50
bank cannot fully undo such actions resulting in prolonged unemployment spells where they51
are vulnerable to further adverse shocks and future uncertainty rises.52
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As in the empirical and theoretical literature on the impact of uncertainty shocks (Bloom (2009)53
and Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2015)), our paper highlights the importance of these type of54
disturbances. However, the focus and results of our analysis are novel in one key respect.55
Unlike the bulk of the uncertainty literature, this paper attempts to model the transmission of56
monetary policy shocks to economic volatility and thus takes a step towards treating economic57
volatility as endogenous.58
Regarding our empirical contribution, the study of Ludvigson et al. (2015) is the closely related.59
Ludvigson et al. (2015) develop a procedure that separates movements in volatility caused by60
primitive (first order) shocks and by uncertainty shocks. However, crucially, they do not identify61
the source of the primitive shocks. In contrast, our focus is on the impact of monetary policy62
shocks on volatility.63
The papers closest to our theoretical work are the studies of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) and64
Swanson (2015), who use a similar theoretical setup to the one employed here to understand the65
asset pricing implications of volatility effects caused by level shocks. Cacciatore and Ravenna66
(2016) develop a real business cycle model, with labour search and matching frictions and an67
occasionally binding constraint on downward wage adjustment to understand the effect from a68
negative productivity shock on volatility.1 Our paper is also related to the work of Bikbov and69
Chernov (2013) and Campbell et al. (2014), who uses macro-finance models to understand the70
relationships between monetary policy and bond risk premia. Petrosky-Nadeau et al. (2018)71
illustrate that when real business cycle models with search & matching friction are calibrated72
and solved carefully, then they can generate endogenous disasters. Our finding support fully73
their analysis, we illustrate below that only the version of the model with these labour frictions74
can give rise to endogenous disasters.275
Finally, our work is related to the heterogeneous agents (HA) literature that introduces un-76
employment into these incomplete markets models either to understand how different fiscal77
policies are transmitted to the economy (McKay and Reis (2016)) or to develop models that78
can account for extreme economic phenomena such as the Great Recession without employ-79
1Cacciatore and Ravenna (2016) also use their framework to understand the state dependent amplification
mechanism of exogenous uncertainty shocks.
2In our framework the endogenous disasters are caused by monetary policy shocks and not by productivity
shocks as it is the case in Petrosky-Nadeau et al. (2018). Endogenous disasters in our model illustrate that the
monetary policy could cause highly adverse economic conditions and this is why agents in the model: (i) are
concerned and (ii) try to insure against these outcomes.
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ing large and persistent exogenous shocks (Ravn and Sterk (2017), Den Haan et al. (2018)).80
Agents in these models cannot fully insure against idiosyncratic unemployment risk and, there-81
fore, they are concerned about their consumption level if the become unemployed. So when82
an adverse shock takes place, they act in a precautionary manner and increase savings. These83
concerns are more elevated in bad times as unemployment spells last longer making the agents’84
responses state dependent. In our setting, the specification of the utility function leads to state-85
dependence of responses. However this feature is now driven by the difference between current86
and steady-state consumption with agents responding by more in states where consumption is87
below the steady state.88
The paper is organised as follows, Section 2 presents the empirical model and discusses the data89
and empirical results. Section 3 reviews the theoretical model, its calibration and presents the90
impulse response analysis. The final section concludes.91
2 Empirical results92
In order to estimate the impact of monetary policy shocks on second moments of key macroe-
conomic variables, we estimate an extended structural VAR model with stochastic volatility.









t et, et ∼ N(0, IN) (1)
In equation (1) Zt is N × 1 vector of endogenous variables and h̃t denotes the N × 1 vector of93
log stochastic volatilities. The coefficients are denoted by the N ×N matrices βj and bk while94










and the N ×N diagonal matrix Ht holds the stochastic volatility of the orthogonalised shocks97
on the main diagonal
(
h̃t = [h1,t, h2,t, .., hN,t]
)
. The structure of the A matrix is chosen by the98
econometrician to model the contemporaneous relationship amongst the reduced-form shocks.99
We discuss our choice of the structure of the A matrix in section 2.3 below.100
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The transition equation for the stochastic volatilities is given by the following VAR model:
h̃t = α + θh̃t−1 +
K∑
j=1
djZt−j + ηt, ηt ∼ N(0, Q), E (et, ηt) = 0 (4)
The constants and coefficients on lags are denoted by the N × 1 and N × N matrices α and101
θ, respectively. Following standard practice in the literature on stochastic volatility models102
(see for e.g. Kim et al. (1998)), we allow h̃t to depend on its first lag. However, the N × N103
coefficient matrices dj also allow lagged endogenous variables to affect the log variances. If these104
coefficients are non-zero, then shocks to equation 1 have an impact on h̃t and consequently on105
Ωt and measures of the unconditional variance of Zt. Note also that the stochastic volatility106
in mean formulation of equation 1 allows feedback from lagged volatilities to the endogenous107
variables.108
The model in equations 1 and 4 contains two innovations relative to the standard BVAR
with stochastic volatility (see Clark (2011)). First, it allows the elements of h̃t to co-move
while most of the previous literature assumes an independent AR or random walk process
for each log variance. The specification used here thus captures the possibility that volatility
of shocks to macroeconomic and financial variables may move together – a phenomenon that
may be important during periods of recession and financial stress. Secondly, unlike previous
applications of this model (see Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2015)), the terms
∑K
k=1 bkh̃t−k and∑K
j=1 djZt−j in equations 1 and 4 allow a dynamic relationship between the level and volatility
of the endogenous variables.3One way to see this is to re-write the observation and transition








































where β (L) , b (L) and d (L) denote lag polynomials of order P , K and K respectively. As109
discussed above, our interest lies in investigating the possible impact of monetary policy shocks110
on the second moments of the endogenous variables. The specification above enables us to111
calculate the impulse response of h̃t and thus var (Zt) to a monetary policy shock identified via112
3An exception is the univariate stochastic volatility in mean model of Chan (2017) that allows lagged effects
from the data in the transition equation.
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an appropriate structure for A.113
Equation 5 reveals two restrictive features of the benchmark model. First, the coefficient114
matrices are time-invariant and the model does not directly account for structural change.115
Second, the error covariance matrix (equation 6) is assumed to be block diagonal and level116
(volatility) shocks have a lagged impact on volatility (levels). In the sensitivity analysis below117
(see Section 3.1.1), we relax these assumptions and show that our main results are qualitatively118
similar in the extended versions of the benchmark model.119
2.1 Data120
The model is estimated using US data on the civilian unemployment rate, annual CPI inflation,121
an interest rate representing the policy instrument and the spread of 10 year government bonds122
over the three month T-bill rate. The data is monthly and, in the benchmark case, runs from123
1947m1 to 2007m12, with the last few years dropped as they represent the period of uncon-124
ventional monetary policy. The first ten years are used as a training sample with estimation125
carried out over the period 1957m1 to 2007m12. In the benchmark model, we use the three126
month T-bill rate as a proxy for the policy instrument. In an additional model specification127
we identify the monetary policy shock using an external instrument approach. As explained128
in section 2.3 below, this version of the model uses a one year government bond yield as the129
policy instrument. The data on the unemployment rate, CPI and the three month T-Bill rate130
is obtained from FRED, while the 1 and 10 year bond yield is obtained from Global Financial131
Data.132
2.2 Estimation and impulse responses133
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods. In the on-line appendix we state in detail the134
Gibbs sampling algorithm used to approximate the posterior distribution. In short, the algo-135
rithm is an extension of the MCMC methods used to estimate Bayesian VARs with stochastic136
volatility, presented for example in Cogley and Sargent (2005).4 The prior distribution for the137
VAR coefficients in equation 1 are based on existing studies and ‘shrink’ the VAR coefficient138
matrix towards an AR specification for each endogenous variable. We employ a similar prior139
4We use a particle Gibbs sampler (see Andrieu et al. (2010). This is described in the technical appendix.
6
for the transition equation and thus assume apriori that each log stochastic volatility follows140
an AR process and that there is no feedback from Zt−j.141
The impulse responses of log var (Zt) to a monetary policy shock are calculated via Monte-
Carlo integration. In particular, the impulse responses are defined as the difference between
the following conditional expectations
IRFt = E (ln var (Zt+k) \Ψt, Zt−1, µ)− E (ln var (Zt+k) \Ψt, Zt−1) (7)
where Ψt denotes the parameters and state variables of the model and µ is the monetary policy142
shock. The first term in equation 7 denotes a forecast of the log volatility conditioned on one143
of the structural shocks µ. Note that, the volatility of the endogenous variables depends on144
the structural shocks through equation 4 above. The second term is the baseline forecast of145
the log variance, i.e. conditioned on the scenario where the shock equals zero. Koop et al.146
(1996) describe how to approximate these conditional expectations via a stochastic simulation147
of the non-linear VAR model. We use 100 simulations to calculate IRFt repeating this for 500148
retained Gibbs draws. In order to account for history dependence of the non-linear responses,149
the calculation is done for t = 1, 12, ...T i.e. every 12th month in the sample and the mean150
across time is reported in the figures below.151
2.3 Model specification and identification152
We set the lag length in the VAR model to 12 and use 3 lags of the endogenous variables in153
the transition equation 4 and 3 lags of the stochastic volatilities in the observation equation 1.154
As shown in the sensitivity analysis, the main results are very similar for longer lag lengths.155
We consider three schemes to identify the monetary policy shock. The schemes are implemented156
by placing restrictions on the column of the A−1 matrix corresponding to the equation for the157
policy instrument. The remaining columns of the matrix correspond to a triangular structure.158
The benchmark identification scheme uses contemporaneous sign restrictions to identify the159
monetary policy shock. We assume that a contractionary policy shock increases the short-term160
interest rate on impact and leads to a rise in unemployment and a fall in CPI inflation. The161
second scheme assumes a recursive structure and implies that monetary policy shocks have162
no contemporaneous impact on unemployment and inflation but can affect the term spread163
immediately. Finally, we follow Gertler and Karadi (2015) and identify the monetary policy164
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shock using an external instrument. This version of the model uses the 1 year government165
bond yield as the measure of the policy rate and the estimation sample runs to 2012 m6.166
Gertler and Karadi (2015) argue that the use of the 1 year rate accounts for unconventional167
policy such as forward guidance. We use the benchmark instrument employed in Gertler and168
Karadi (2015) – i.e. surprise changes in three month ahead fed funds futures rate on FOMC169
dates. As discussed in Mertens and Ravn (2013), under the assumption that the instrument is170
relevant and uncorrelated with other structural shocks, the impulse vector to a unit shock can171
be recovered by a regression of the reduced form residuals on the instrument.5172
3 Results173
3.1 Impulse response to a monetary policy shock174
Figure 1 presents the impulse response to a contractionary monetary policy shock normalised175
to increase the T-Bill rate by 100 basis points. The unemployment rate rises by about 0.2176
percentage points at the two year horizon. Inflation displays a persistent decline of about 0.3177
percentage points. Finally, the term spread falls by about 70 basis points on impact.178
The last three rows of the figure present the response of the unconditional volatility to this179
shock. It is clear from the figure that the volatility of all endogenous variables rises in response180
to this shock. This is reflected in the measure of overall volatility, the log determinant of the181
covariance matrix of the endogenous variables which shows a persistent increase. The response182
of volatility is persistent lasting for about 2 years with the magnitude of the response of interest183
rate and inflation volatility slightly larger than the remaining variables.184
Figure 2 presents the response of the volatility of the endogenous variables estimated using the185
three identification schemes discussed above. The second row of the figure shows the recursive186
identification schemes produces results very similar to the benchmark case. Similarly, when the187
external instrument is used to identify the monetary policy shock the impulse responses still188
suggest that volatility rises after a monetary contraction.189
5Gertler and Karadi (2015) present a detailed evidence that suggests that three month ahead fed funds
futures rate innovations provide a strong instrument to identify monetary policy shocks.
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3.1.1 Robustness checks190
Time variation As noted above, the benchmark model restricts the VAR coefficients to be191
fixed over time. To check the structural stability of the estimated impulse responses we extend192
the benchmark model to allow the coefficients to be time-varying. In particular, we estimate193
the following version of the model:194












h̃t = αt + θth̃t−1 +
K∑
j=1
dt,jZt−j + ηt (10)









vec ([αt, θt, dt,1, .., dt,K ]) the evolution of the coefficients is determined by the additional transi-196
tion equations:197
Θt = Θt−1 + Q̃
1/2
1 v1t (11)








′ ∼ N (0, IN̄) with N̄ = N (NP +NK + 1) + N (N +NK + 1) + N . The198
model can be estimated using an extended version of the Gibbs algorithm summarised above.199
The extension is described in the technical appendix.200
The time-varying impulse responses of volatility to a 1 unit monetary contraction are shown201
in Figure 3. As in the benchmark case, sign restrictions are used to identify the policy shock.202
As noted in previous studies, there is some evidence suggesting that the impact of monetary203
policy on the real economy has declined over time (see Boivin and Giannoni (2006)). As in204
Boivin and Giannoni (2006) the inflation response becomes positive at medium horizons in the205
earlier part of the sample. While there is some weak evidence to suggest that the response of206
volatility may have been slightly larger during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, the207
impact on volatility remains positive and persistent throughout the sample period.208
Further sensitivity checks The technical appendix provides a range of further checks. The209
benchmark model in equations 5 and 6 does not allow a contemporaneous relationship between210
level and volatility shocks. Following Alessandri and Mumtaz (2018), we extend the model211
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and relax this assumption. Impulse responses from this version of the model (see Section212
4.1, pages 14-17 in the appendix) support the conclusion that volatility rises after a monetary213
contraction.6 In addition, we show that the results survive if a longer lag length is used214
in the benchmark model. Similarly, versions of the model that include the Federal Funds215
rate, industrial production or stock returns produce results similar to the benchmark case.216
Finally, positioning the short-term interest rate first in the recursive order or using the Romer217
and Romer (2004) measure of monetary policy shocks as an instrument produces responses of218
volatility that support the results depicted in the second and third rows of Figure 2.219
3.2 Variance decomposition220
To investigate the importance of the monetary policy shock we construct the forecast error221
variance (FEV) decomposition for the benchmark model using the method described in Lanne222
and Nyberg (2016) for non-linear models. Table 1 presents the contribution of the monetary223
policy shock and compares it with the contribution of all 4 level shocks in the VAR model. The224
third and fourth columns of the table display the contribution to the FEV of volatility of the225
variables while the final two columns display the contribution to the FEV of the level. The226
final column of the table shows that, as highlighted by several previous studies, the monetary227
policy shock makes a modest contribution to future movements in the unemployment rate and228
inflation. As in Bernanke et al. (2005), the contribution to the FEV of the unemployment rate229
is about 10 percent while the contribution to inflation FEV does not exceed 5 percent. The230
contribution to the interest rates is higher, especially at shorter horizons. When compared to231
the contribution of all level shocks jointly (column 5 of the table), the monetary policy shock232
does not appear to be the most important component.233
Column four of table 1 shows that the contribution of the monetary policy shock to the volatility234
of the variables is also modest in absolute terms and ranges from about 5 to 7 percent. However,235
in relative terms, the monetary policy shock appears to be important, especially at the one year236
horizon. For example, the total contribution of the level shocks to the FEV of unemployment237
volatility at this horizon is 16 percent. Almost half of this contribution comes from the monetary238
6In the technical appendix we present results using the proxy VAR of Gertler and Karadi (2015) extended
to include the measure of uncertainty developed by Jurado et al. (2015). Results from this model, which allows
for a contemporaneous impact of monetary policy shock on uncertainty, support our key conclusions.
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policy shock. Similarly, the monetary policy component in the contribution of level shocks to239
the FEV of inflation, interest rate and spread volatility accounts for 40 to 50 percent at the one240
year horizon. However, the relative importance of this shock declines at the 60 month horizon241
suggesting that other level or second moment shocks may play a role in the long run.242
To investigate the economic importance of monetary policy transmission via volatility, we243
estimate a version of the benchmark model that restricts the effects of level shocks on second244
moments to be equal to zero (by setting dj = 0 in equation 4).
7 In Figure 4, we compare the245
impulse response to a monetary policy shock in the restricted and the benchmark model. It is246
clear from the figure that the response of unemployment and inflation is less persistent in the247
restricted case. This implies that the cumulated change in these variables is estimated be much248
smaller if the effect of policy shocks on volatility is assumed away.249
4 Theoretical Analysis250
In order to investigate the transmission of monetary policy shocks to volatility, we build and251
estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model. We first describe the building blocks of the key sectors252
of the DSGE model and consider how time-varying volatility arises in this set-up. We then253
use an estimated version of the model to calculate the response of the key variables and their254
volatility to monetary policy shocks.255
4.1 DSGE Model256
Households: The economy is populated by a continuum of households (h ∈ [0, 1]) that attain
utility from consumption C̃t (h) and leisure 1− Lt (h), where Lt (h) denotes the fraction of the
household that is employed. Household’s preferences are separable
u
(














where σL is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity, σC stands for the inverse of intertemporal elas-257





eσzωz,t denotes the non-stationary productivity258
process (the tilde indicates that the variable is non-stationary) where Z is the steady-state259
value of the productivity growth, ρz indicates the degree of persistence and σz is the standard260
deviation of the productivity growth process.261
7Based on the deviance information criterion (DIC) of Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) the benchmark model
is preferred to this restricted model. The DIC for the restricted model is -4526.68, while the corresponding
estimate for the benchmark model is smaller (-4560.82) indicating an improved fit.
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The empirical analysis above illustrates convincingly that the changes in the policy instrument
have an impact on the level and volatility of endogenous variables. This evidence points to
the existence of important non-linearities in the data that give rise to these effects. Given our
stylised facts are related to volatility, it seems a natural starting point to investigate whether
these non-linearities are due to agents’ preferences. The analysis of Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012) and Swanson (2015) suggest that when agents form recursive preferences (Epstein and
Zin (1989)) then a productivity level shock induces the stochastic volatility of the series in the
model to vary. We proceed, therefore, by assuming that agents have preferences of this form:
Vt (h) = u
(






The attractive feature of Epstein-Zin preferences is that the coefficient of relative risk aversion
decouples from the intertemporal elasticity parameter. The parameter γ illustrates the degree
of agents’ desire for an early resolution of uncertainty over future consumption. Household




+ Tt (h) = P̃tW̃tLt (h) + (1− Lt (h)) P̃tB̃t + D̃t−1 (h) + Ξ̃t (h) (15)
where P̃t is the price index, D̃t (h) is the one period risk free government debt, Rt is the return262
on investing on the government debt, W̃t stands for the real wage, Tt (h) is the lump sum taxes,263
B̃t is the unemployment benefit and Ξ̃t (h) denotes firms’ profits.264
The budget constraint reveals the existence of real labour market frictions that lead some265
members of the household to become unemployed. However, they enjoy the same consumption266
levels as the employed members due to our complete markets assumption. The structure of267
the labour market is discussed below. Here we mention two pieces of evidence supporting the268
argument that search and matching frictions could be a vital part of the mechanism relating269
monetary policy shocks and second moments. Firstly, the empirical exercise undertaken in270
Section 3.2 (Figure 4) reveals that the impact of monetary policy on unemployment is enhanced271
by the impact of this shock on volatility. This is indicative of the existence of frictions in the272
labour market that re-enforce the effects of volatility.273
Secondly, there are a growing number of studies employing heterogeneous agents models that274
argue in favour of including unemployment into these incomplete market models in order to275
better understand extreme economic episodes such as the Great Recession (Ravn and Sterk276
(2017), Den Haan et al. (2018)). The outcome of these studies is further supported by the277
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work of Petrosky-Nadeau et al. (2018) that illustrates search and matching frictions in a real278
business cycle could give rise to endogenous disasters when the model is calibrated and solved279
carefully. These two different type of approaches seems to indicate that these labour frictions280
may have very rich nonlinear implications. Finally, during the ZLB period and the introduction281
of the forward guidance policy by the FED and Bank of England, unemployment became the282
primary policy variable in terms of monetary authorities communicating the end date of the283
excess stimulus in the economy.8284
Labour Market: The existence of a real – search and matching – friction in the labour market285
(Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)) prevents all job-seekers (Ut = 1− (1− δN)Lt−1) from being286
matched with vacancies (Υt) posted by firms and they end up unemployed (ut = 1− Lt). The287
matching technology is described by the following Cobb-Douglas (expression 16)288
Mt = µ̄Uµt Υ
1−µ
t (16)
Lt = (1− δN)Lt−1 +QΥt Υt (17)
Ψt = κZ̃tΥt (18)
While employment evolves according to equation 17, where δN is the separation probability.289
This formulation incorporates the assumption that new hires start working in the same period290
they are hired (Blanchard and Gali (2010)). Furthermore, firms in order to be able to hire a291
worker they need to post a vacancy and this incurs a cost (expression 18, see Mortensen and292
Pissarides (1994)). In other words, the cost is a linear function of the vacancies posted. This293
is different set-up than the cost of hiring function used in Gertler et al. (2008). However, this294
particular formulation implies that the cost is paid after the vacancy is filled and it reflects295
internal costs of adjusting the number of employees (such as training). This specification, thus,296
minimises the exposure of entrepreneur’s profits unsuccessful matches and, consequently, to297
uncertainty, since the cost is only paid after the vacancy is filled. This feature makes this298
formulation less suitable in our setting.299
Final Good Producer: The next two paragraphs discuss the price Phillips curve. The set-300
up is quite standard and the nominal rigidities are introduced as a simple way to make output301
8In August 2013, the Bank of England augmented its policy toolkit with (state dependent) forward guidance.
Unemployment became a forward guidance threshold variable and the Bank of England started publishing its
fan chart in order to better communicate with public its projection about real economy.
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demand driven in the short run and to allow monetary policy to be able to affect the economic302
















where ε denotes the elasticity of substitution between differentiated intermediate goods (f ∈ [0 1]).304
The demand for intermediate goods (expression 20) results from profit maximisation and the305
assumption that the final good producer operates under perfect competition.306
Intermediate Good Producers: Similar to Krause and Lubik (2007) and Krause et al.
(2008) we assume that there is a continuum of firms (f ∈ [0, 1]) that post vacancies, combine
employment, fixed capital and employ the following technology:
Ỹt (f) = Z̃t (Lt (f))
1−φKφ (21)
to produce the intermediate good, where φ is the capital share in the production function.307
These producers solve a two-stage problem. In the first stage, taking the wage and the cost of308
filling a vacancy as given they decide how many vacancies to post and people to employ, these309






 MCt+j (f) Ỹt+j (f)− W̃t+jLt+j (f)−R
KK − κZ̃t+jΥt+j (f)
+Θ̃t+j (f)
(
(1− δN)Lt+j−1 (f) +QΥt+j (f) Υt+j (f)− Lt+j (f)
)
 (22)
where MCt (the marginal cost), Θ̃t (the shadow value of hiring an additional worker) are the
Lagrange multipliers associated with the goods’ production function and the employment’s law








−γ (C̃t (h)− bC̃t−1
C̃t+1 (h)− bC̃t
)σC
In the second stage, producers set the price of the intermediate good that maximises their
profits. The optimisation problem in this case reflects that prices are set in a staggered manner.





, while those firms who miss the signal set prices based on a rule of thumb
backward looking indexation scheme
(




. As explained in Christiano et al.
(2005), this pricing setup allows us to replicate the hump shaped response of inflation to the






























Wage Determination: The wage is determined by solving a Nash bargaining problem be-
tween workers and firms that takes place in order to decide how to split the surplus produced by
a match (see Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Krause et al. (2008) amongst others). This
simple framework is commonly used in the literature and assumes that newly hired workers get
the existing wage, an assumption that is also supported by some empirical evidence (Galuscak




− W̃t + βEtMt+1 (1− δN) J̃Ft+1 (24)
On the other hand, the value of an employed and unemployed worker is given by:311









































Similarly to Krause and Lubik (2007) and Leduc and Liu (2016), we allow for real wage rigidity








Government and Aggregation: The government in this economy runs a balanced budget:









eσgωg,t is the of the government
share in the economy. Monetary policy is set based on Taylor Type rule:












where Π is the inflation target, ρR is the interest rate smoothing parameter, ζΠ and ζY d are the
policy reaction coefficients to inflation and demand growth, respectively, and ωR,t = ρεRωR,t−1+
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σRεR,t is the monetary policy shock. Finally, the market clearing condition is derived after a






= C̃t + G̃t + Ψ̃t (31)
The de-trended and steady-state calculations are discussed in the technical appendix (Section312
5.1, pages 21-22).313
4.2 Heteroscedasticity314
The novel part of our analysis is that we focus on the volatility implications of the monetary
policy shock. With the term volatility or measured uncertainty we refer to the heteroscedastic
response of a variable, say xt, defined as in Basu and Bundick (2017) and Swanson (2015)







σx,t = vart (xt) = Et(xt+1 − Etxt+1)2 (33)
and σx is the stochastic steady-state standard deviation of the variable xt.
9 It is perhaps315
important to highlight that equation (33) coincides with the definition of volatility studied by316
Jurado et al. (2015). As explained in Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) and Swanson (2015),317
the higher moments of economy’s endogenous state vector are time-varying (σx,t) due to (i)318
the additive separability of consumption in the period utility function and (ii) the Epstein-319
Zin preferences. According to these authors the additive separability property of consumption320
makes the model non-homogeneous and this is what induces a small degree of heteroscedasticity,321
which is further enhanced by the risk aversion parameter (γ).322
The economic intuition behind these two technical conditions is actually quite simple. The323
additive separability property of consumption makes agents’ responses to economic shocks324
depend on the current level of on the state of the economy. For instance, when the current325
level of consumption is low (or the marginal utility of consumption is high) then consumption326
uncertainty is higher (relative to the case where the initial level of consumption/output is327
high) and this reflects agents’ elevated concerns about future shocks. As an adverse shock that328
lowers output further is going to induce a proportionally a larger reduction in utility relative329
to the case where the initial level of consumption/output was high. This channel is the further330
enhanced by Epstein-Zin preferences as the risk parameter reflects how much agents dislike331
9In the text below, we use the term uncertainty to refer to ‘measured uncertainty’.
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elevated uncertainty (Rudebusch and Swanson (2012)).332
Loosely speaking, agents in this economy price adverse shocks more heavily in ‘bad times’333
when compared to ‘good times’. This behaviour induces a wedge between the mode of the334
distribution xt and its mean as the latter captures these elevated concerns. Figures 5 illustrates335
this phenomenon. We use the model developed in this study (and the estimates discussed336
below) to simulate the data. Panel A of Figure 5 shows the probability density function337
of unemployment rate, unemployment expected duration, labour income, GDP and annual338
inflation as deviations from their stochastic steady states when the monetary policy shock is339
drawn from its estimated distribution.10 It is apparent that even under one standard deviation340
monetary policy shocks the probability density functions displays a ‘downward risk’, meaning341
that the average unemployment rate and the average expected duration of being unemployed342
are higher than their modes. Similarly, the average labour income, GDP and inflation fall to left343
of their modes. We repeat the same exercise in Panel B of Figure 5, however, we apply larger344
shocks this time (two times their standard deviation). As expected, the asymmetry becomes345
more pronounced indicating that agents economic behaviour is also a function of the state of346
the economy.347
The above simulations illustrate that under certain conditions monetary policy actions can348
have quite dramatic implications for the economy; for instance, unemployment rate could rise349
6 percentage points (pps) above the stochastic steady state, while inflation, GDP and labour350
income could fall 10% below the stochastic steady state, respectively. These adverse economic351
conditions are taken into account by agents when they form their decisions optimally and try352
to minimise their exposure to these downward risks.353
Monetary Policy and Volatility: To understand the role of monetary policy in inducing354
volatility it is instructive to consider the solution of the model approximated to the third order:355













3 + σηεt (34)
10Both the non-stationary productivity and government spending shocks are switched off for the rest of the
analysis. To be precise, although the values of the latter two shocks are set to zero, their standard deviations
are not. This affects peoples average behaviour as their expectations are based on the distribution of the two
shocks and not just on their realisation.
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where zt is the state vector of the economy and εt is the vector of structural shocks. The
matrices hz, Hzz, Hzzz, hσσz, hσσ and hσσσ denote the derivatives of the system with respect to
the state and/or shock vectors for different orders and evaluated at the non-stochastic steady-
state (see Andreasen et al. (2018) for the exact details). The one step ahead expectation of
this expression (ignoring constant terms for simplicity) can be written as:
Etzt+1 = hzzt +Hzzvart (zt) +Hzzzskewt (zt) (35)
where vart (zt) = Et (zt ⊗ zt) is the column stacked covariance matrix of zt at time t and356
skewt (zt) = Et (zt ⊗ zt ⊗ zt) is approximately the column stacked skewness matrix of zt at357
time t.11 Thus, along with the current state, zt, the higher moments of the system directly358
affect the one step ahead expectation and these moments are time-varying due to the speci-359
fication of the agents’ preferences. As discussed earlier, Epstein-Zin agents have a preference360
for an early resolution of uncertainty with the magnitude of this preference determined by the361
terms Hzzvart (zt) + Hzzzskewt (zt). In other words, this preference for an early resolution of362
uncertainty is a function of the location of the current state of the economy relative to its363
distribution. Moreover, the non-linearity of equation 35 implies that the agents’ aversion to364
uncertainty is larger when the shock is negative and pushes the economy below the steady365
state.12366
Because of this non-linearity, when a contractionary monetary policy shock occurs, agents367
start forming expectations that are more heavily influenced by the possibility of future adverse368
shocks. This asymmetry increases the dispersion of their forecast errors meaning that volatility369
(see equation 33) increases. Loosely speaking, as the economy contracts, households and firms370
start hedging against the worst case scenario through their expectations. While this reduces371
their exposure, the dispersion of their forecast errors increases as they are concerned about372
events that do not necessarily arise.373
Table 2 compares a set of data estimated disaster statistics reported by Petrosky-Nadeau et al.374
(2018), with those predicted by the model that is subject to a monetary policy shock. The375
aim of this second exercise is to use data evidence to quantify the risks to which the agents in376
11This term capture information about the tails of the distribution but, unlike the skewness, it is not nor-
malised by the standard deviation.
12We illustrate this point numerically in the technical appendix by comparing the responses to positive and
negative policy shocks in the model (Figure 10, page 35). The absolute contribution of uncertainty to these
responses is higher if the shock is negative and these concerns intensify with the magnitude of the shock.
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this economy are exposed and, consequently, to understand why they want to hedge against377
them. As in Petrosky-Nadeau et al., we apply the peak-to-trough method discussed in Barro378
and Ursua (2008) to to identify rare disasters.The disasters are defined as cumulative fractional379
declines in per capita output of at least 10%.380
When the economy is exposed to one standard deviation policy shocks, then the disaster proba-381
bility is significantly less than 1%. However, if this highly unlikely event ever takes place then it382
lasts for almost 7 years and growth reduces by almost 12%.13 Not surprisingly, when the econ-383
omy is perturbed with larger policy shocks, then the disaster probability and the size of output384
collapse increase significantly and non-linearly, while the duration of disaster state decreases:385
The probability of disaster and its size rise to 5% and 14% respectively, while the duration386
of the disaster shortens to 4 years. Unlike in the case of one standard deviation shocks these387
estimates are significant closer to those obtained using actual data. Finally, the comparison of388
the second and third columns of Table 2 illustrates again that agents’ responses to monetary389
policy shocks are different at different stages of the cycle.390
4.3 Calibration391
The model is estimated using limited information impulse response matching techniques (Chris-392
tiano et al. (2005), Christiano et al. (2010)). However, the value of a small number of parameters393
is decided prior to the estimation. To be precise, the share of capital in the production (φ)394
and its depreciation rate have been calibrated to 0.36 and 0.025, numbers typically used in the395
literature (Christiano et al. (2005)). The steady-state unemployment (u) is set equal to 5.8%396
(the sample mean), while the steady-state value of output (y) to 1. The time discount factor (β)397
equals 0.995, while the both the steady-state value of inflation and productivity growth have398
been set to 2%. The last three parameters imply that the non-stochastic steady-state of the399
annual policy rate is 6%. Similar to Smets and Wouters (2007), the government spending and400
investment to GDP ratios are calibrated to 0.18 and 0.2, respectively. Finally, the steady-state401
value of the probability filling the vacancy is 70% (Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)).402






, ρεZ , ρεG , ρεR ,403
13In the online Appendix (Section 5.3) we develop a version of the model without search and matching real
labour frictions but with sticky nominal wages. Although, this version of the model replicates the cyclical
dynamics remarkably well, it fails to produce an endogenous disaster even when the economy is hit with 2
standard deviation policy shocks.
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σεZ , σεG and σεR are selected to match the nonlinear VAR responses to an identified monetary404
policy shock using the benchmark identification scheme. The model is solved using third-order405
perturbation methods and the impulse responses are calculated relative to the stochastic steady406
state (Cacciatore and Ravenna (2016)).14407
The objective of the estimation is for the model to be able to replicate not only the empirical408
responses to a monetary policy shock illustrated in Figure 1 but the also the contribution409
of the ‘uncertainty channel’ to these responses. This is defined as the difference between the410
unrestricted and restricted responses plotted in Figure 4 and discussed in Section 3.2. The latter411
set of targets ensures that the parameters that control the size of the uncertainty channel in the412
model are calibrated carefully and the predictions of the model about the importance of that413
channel are in line with those observed in the data.15 As it will become apparent later in our414
analysis, the last set of moments acts also a natural metric that allows us to assess which part415
of the transmission mechanism is responsible for the existence of the endogenous uncertainty416
channel. The process used to estimate the DSGE contributions of uncertainty follows closely417
the steps employed for the empirical models. To be precise, the uncertainty contribution is418
defined as the difference between the responses obtained using the third order solution model419
minus those by using only the first order component of the solution.420
4.4 Estimation Results421
Figure 5 in the online appendix (page 30) illustrates the ability of the theoretical model to422
replicate the identified empirical responses (Panel A) as well as the contribution of the un-423
certainty channel to these responses (Panel B), respectively. Even though the literature has424
questioned ability of a “simple” search and matching New Keynesian model to jointly replicate425
the dynamics of both unemployment and inflation (see the discussion in Krause and Lubik426
(2007) and Gertler et al. (2008)), our estimated model seems to be robust to this criticism as427
it reproduces the data dynamics remarkably well.428
In this study, however, our results go further. The model is capable of replicating: (i) the VAR429
based stochastic volatility responses to a level monetary policy shock and, (ii) the empirically430
14No pruning is applied in our calculations, which have been implemented using Dynare 4.4.3. The model
and replication files can be downloaded from authors’ webpages. We also check if our results are robust if we
apply Koop et al. (1996) methodology to calculate the IRFs and we find that our results are almost identical.
We choose to employ the first method to calculate the IRFs as it dramatically reduces the estimation time.
15We would like to thank an anonymous referee for proposing this exercise.
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identified contribution of the uncertainty channel.16 This is a new set of results that further431
supports the analysis of Petrosky-Nadeau et al. regarding the aptitude of DSGE models with432
search and matching labour market frictions of reproducing highly non-linear dynamics seen in433
the data.434
Returning to the discussion of the estimated parameters (Table 1, online appendix, page 31),435
the remaining discussion illustrates that the model can replicate the data features mentioned436
in the previous paragraph by relying on a set of parameter values that have been extensively437
used in the literature. Perhaps the less common parameter estimate is that for the Epstein-438
Zin risk coefficient (γ = 115.57) with the estimated value indicating that agents dislike future439
uncertainty. This value is similar to the one used in the Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) and440
Swanson (2015). As explained in Swanson (2015) – and it is further illustrated in the next441
section – this parameter only has a small effect on the stochastic volatility of macroeconomic442
variables and therefore the large magnitude is innocuous.17443
In terms of the utility kernel, the model demands some curvature (σC = 2.15, Chen et al.444
(2012)) and (σL = 4.00, Christiano et al. (2010)) in order to reconcile the predicted dynamics445
with those in the data. The degree of consumption smoothing (b = 0.57), is close to the446
estimates reported by Christiano et al. (2005).447
The parameters that govern the labour market block of the model, the Cobb-Douglas matching448
parameter (µ = 0.40), the job separation rate (δN = 0.18), the income replacement ratio449
(100B̄ = B
WL
= 54%) and the steady-state, the bargaining power for workers (η = 0.50) search450
and matching friction (100 Φ
Y
= 1%) are again consistent with those in the literature (see for451
instance, Krause and Lubik (2007) and Krause et al. (2008), Gertler et al. (2008) and Hagedorn452
and Manovskii (2008) among others).453
Consistent with the analysis Krause and Lubik (2007) and Leduc and Liu (2016) (among454
others), the model requires a high degree of real wage rigidity (ιw = 0.89) in order to be able to455
16While the VAR-based volatility responses are all hump shaped, this feature is less evident in the model.
This is likely to be because the model incorporates simplifying assumptions and does not capture all aspects of
the data.
17This is not the case for asset price variables as the they are functions of the stochastic discount factor. The
risk parameter has a great influence on the second term of the stochastic discount factor that captures how
agents ‘trade’ uncertainty across time. As it is discussed briefly in the next section, we discovered that the risk
parameter variations have perhaps a larger impact on the stochastic steady-state than the cyclical dynamics
regarding the macro variables.
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match the volatility of unemployment in the data (Figure 5, Panel A, page 30, online appendix).456
As explained by these authors and it can be seen from equation (28), under this calibration457
paid wages decouple from productivity and this leads to high surplus for firms (relative to the458
situation of no real wage rigidity) stimulating vacancy creation.459
Similar to Christiano et al. (2005) a high degree of price indexation (ι = 0.72) and a small460
probability of resetting prices optimally (1− ξ = 0.03) are needed for the model to match the461
response of inflation after a monetary policy shock. Furthermore, the steady-state value of462
firms’ markup is 50% (ε = 3.0) a value similar to Smets and Wouters (2007) and Gertler et al.463
(2008). Finally, the estimates of the policy reaction coefficients are similar to those reported in464
the literature (Krause et al. (2008), Gertler et al. (2008), Leduc and Liu (2016)).465
4.5 Impulse Response Analysis466
The aim of this section is to discuss the transmission mechanism of monetary policy shocks to467
macroeconomic volatility. We illustrate this via impulse response analysis. We first describe468
the results in the benchmark model and then investigate the features of the model that drive469
the transmission of the shock.470
4.5.1 Benchmark results471
The blue solid line in Panel A of Figure 6 shows the agents’ responses to a monetary policy472
shock estimated using the benchmark version of the model.473
Households: Starting from the household side, as consumption moves away from its steady-474
state level due to the adverse policy shock, agents start becoming concerned about the fact that475
another adverse economic shock is going to take their current consumption even further away476
from its steady-state. For the agents, this is more costly in utility terms than if consumption had477
been above its steady-state prior to the adverse shock (see Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) and478
Swanson (2015)). To insure themselves against this downward risk they act in a precautionary479
manner and reduce current consumption by a larger amount (Basu and Bundick (2017) and480
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2015)).481
Furthermore, in an economy with search and matching frictions, the agents face additional482
risks: i.e. the risk of job separation and unemployment. This enhances households’ concerns483
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about their expected consumption plan and intensifies their desire to hedge against this uncer-484
tainty. An adverse shock that reduces consumption when the latter is already below its steady485
state would have a larger detrimental impact when agents are unemployed. We consider the486
importance of these risks below.487
Firms: Firms are owned by households and so they use the same stochastic discount factor488
to weight expected profits. This means that a profit reduction is more costly when the pre-489
vious period profits had been below rather than above their steady-state. As it is explained490
carefully in Swanson (2015), these preferences induce entrepreneurs to devote more attention491
to generating profits in bad times. However, firms who face adverse economic conditions are492
exposed to: (i) paying a wage higher than worker’s productivity (taking into account future493
forgone costs of hiring) due to high wage rigidity and to, (ii) low expected demand for their494
output.495
To mitigate these exposures firms pause hiring. As explained in Bloom (2009) and Leduc and496
Liu (2016) filling a vacancy is an irreversible decision that has long-term implications. There-497
fore, entrepreneurs act more cautiously and post even less vacancies pushing up unemployment.498
Moreover, the firm recognises that a lower price could lead to a higher demand for its output499
and, consequently, more profits. Despite the fall in the marginal cost (caused by the fact that500
supply exceeds labour demand), the firm has an incentive to a set an even lower price during501
bad times in order to secure more demand and, consequently, hedge itself against future more502
adverse economic outcomes.503
As inflation falls and monetary authorities reduce the policy rate only gradually (due to their504
preferences of avoiding injecting too much interest rate volatility) the real interest rate remains505
persistently positive and this enhances the desire for saving.506
Impact on volatility: As shown in the last row of Panel A of Figure 6, volatility increases507
after a monetary policy shock. As discussed in Section 4.2 above, the volatility of a variable508
can be viewed as a wedge between the mean and the mode of the distribution. When the509
adverse monetary policy shock occurs, agents in the economy form expectations about future510
events. Households take into account the probability of longer unemployment spells during511
which they may be exposed to additional negative shocks. Similarly, firms’ expectations about512
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profits are skewed downwards. However, as the time evolves and no further shocks are realised513
this wedge between expectations and what actually happens eases, and so does the volatility514
in the economy.515
Contribution of uncertainty: The blue circle line in Panel B of Figure 6 isolates the con-516
tributions of uncertainty in the transmission of monetary policy. The uncertainty contribution517
is defined as the difference between the response derived by using the full third order solution of518
the model minus the responses produced using only the first term of that solution. For instance,519
unemployment increases 0.3 pps after one standard deviation monetary policy shock (Panel A520
of Figure 6, blue solid line/left y-axis) and 1/3 (30%) of this increase is due to the uncertainty521
(Panel B of Figure 6, blue circle line/left y-axis). Furthermore, uncertainty seems to account522
for almost 50% of the output, labour income and inflation fall. This exercise reveals that: (i)523
the endogenous uncertainty channel plays a sizeable role in the transmission of the monetary524
policy shock and (ii) it manifests itself as a demand type shock (Leduc and Liu (2016)).525
4.5.2 Key Features of the model526
It is interesting to consider the features of the model that drive the impact of monetary policy527
on second moments. In particular, the model contains three ingredients that play a role: (1)528
Search and Matching labour market frictions, (2) interest rate smoothing by the monetary529
authorities and (3) Epstien-Zin preferences. In order to gauge the role of these features of the530
model, we derive the impulse responses under the counterfactual scenario where these channels531
are switched off one by one.532
Labour Market Frictions We pursue two exercises: (i) we consider what happens when533
non-stochastic steady-state probability of finding a job (QU) is (almost) equal to one (or the534
non-stochastic steady-state of unemployment is almost equal to zero) and (ii) what happens535
when the friction is removed completely but nominal wages adjust only gradual (sticky nominal536
wages, Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007)). Due to the space required for the537
development of the second model, the latter exercise is conducted in the online Appendix538
(Section 5.3), but the intuition of the results coincides with the first experiment and it is,539
therefore, discussed here briefly.540
Panel A of Figure 6 compares the agents’ responses to a monetary policy shock derived by the541
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benchmark version of the model (blue solid line) against the responses when implicitly there is542
no risk that agents will ever become unemployed (QU = 1, red dashed line).18 Panel B of Figure543
6 on the other hand identifies the contribution of the uncertainty channel for both versions of544
the model. Without the search and matching labour market real friction the contribution of the545
endogenous uncertainty channel to the economy is substantially smaller (red cross line/right546
y-axis). This evidence seems to indicate that households fear that they can remain unemployed547
for an extended period of time (the expected average duration is given by 1
1−(1−QU )). Their548
fear is magnified by the possibility that, during this period, another adverse shock that moves549
their consumption away from its steady-state might arrive. To insure themselves against this550
uncertainty, they reduce consumption by more (relative to the situation where they move from551
unemployment to employment almost instantaneously) when the monetary shock takes place.552
We develop in the online appendix (Section 5.3) a version of the model without search and553
matching frictions but with sticky nominal wages (Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters554
(2007)) and Epstein-Zin preferences (SW). The estimated version of the SW model again repli-555
cates the cyclical responses remarkably well. However, the steady-state value of the output556
stochastic volatility is almost zero and the model fails to produce distribution skewness and557
endogenous disasters.558
These two quite different exercises seems to converge to the same conclusion that search and559
matching frictions are important. This is a result that seems to go hand in hand with the finding560
of the heterogenous agents literature. To be precise, Ravn and Sterk (2017) and Den Haan561
et al. (2018) (amongst others) argue convincingly about the necessity of incorporating search562
and matching friction (along with nominal price or/and wage rigidities) into these incomplete563
markets model in order to produce quantitative sizeable results without replying on large and564
very persistent shocks. It also coincides with the analysis of Petrosky-Nadeau et al. (2018),565
who argue that DSGE models with search and matching frictions can generate endogenous566
disasters.567
Interest Rate Smoothing Taking the real labour frictions as given, we consider how discre-568
tionary monetary actions could cause uncertainty to increase endogenously and significantly.569
The systematic part of the monetary policy consists of the two parts: (i) the response to devia-570
18This is implemented in the model by lowering the non-stochastic steady-state unemployment rate to 0.01%
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tion from FED’s inflation and unemployment gap objectives and (ii) the interest rate smoothing.571
Our investigation seems to suggest that it is the policymaker’s desire to ‘smooth’ changes in572
the policy rate that actually causes uncertainty to rise after a monetary policy shock.19 To be573
precise, when the interest rate smoothing coefficient is set to zero (ρR = 0), the uncertainty574
channel disappears and the impact of monetary policy on second moments is close to zero. (Fig-575
ure 7). This happens as the lack of preference for interest rate smoothing allows authorities576
to loosen policy very quickly in order to restore both the inflation and unemployment targets.577
In other words, agents do not seem to be particularly concerned about the ability of monetary578
authorities to discretionary deviate from their objective function as long as they can reverse579
their actions and restore economy’s steady-state.580
Epstein-Zin Risk Coefficient Figure 8 compares the responses (Panel A) and the uncer-581
tainty contributions (Panel B) in the benchmark case and the counterfactual case where the582
risk coefficient is set to zero (γ = 0). With γ = 0 the importance of the endogenous uncertainty583
channel declines and the uncertainty contributions are substantially smaller. Moreover, the584
response of volatility in the counterfactual case is smaller than the benchmark case.585
However, these results also suggest that in relative terms the dramatic reduction in γ from 115586
to 0 does not lead to effects that are extreme. As the economies’ agents have a high desire of587
early resolution of future uncertainty, the central bank is expected to keep policy expansionary588
for longer to meet its objectives. As a result, the long-term interest rate falls by more than 30589
bps and stays below its stochastic steady-state for more than a year. Finally, this exercise is an590
additional evidence in favour of endogenous uncertainty acts as a demand channel (shock).20591
5 Conclusion592
This study investigates the response of macroeconomic volatility to an unexpected increase in593
the policy rate. For this purpose we develop an empirical model that allows us to estimate the594
response of macroeconomic volatility to a monetary policy shock. To investigate the transmis-595
19In the online Appendix (Section 5.1) we illustrate that if the reaction coefficient to unemployment gap is
increased beyond empirically plausible values (such as greater than one) then the uncertainty channel diminishes
significantly. Although, this simulation lacks empirical support (as we do not observed such high values for ζu
in the literature) the results further enforce the message of this paragraph. The higher policy response to
unemployment countervails the smoothing parameter and the policy rate is decreased faster in order to support
the recovery of the economy.
20In the online appendix (Section 5.1) we investigate what happens to the economy when the inflation target
increases from 2% to 4%. We find that the uncertainty effects from this policy change are small.
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sion channel of the shock, we build a simple New Keynesian model, with search and matching596
labour frictions and Epstein-Zin preferences.597
The empirical model suggests that a 100 basis points increase in the policy rate causes un-598
employment and inflation volatility to rise by around 10% above its unconditional value. The599
theoretical model has been calibrated to match the SVAR responses. Simulations from the the-600
oretical model suggest that it is the coexistence of agents’ fears about being prolonged unem-601
ployment and monetary authorities’ desire for gradual policy adjustments that causes volatility602
to increase to levels observed empirically. In other words, households understand the risks of603
becoming unemployed and the fact that during the unemployment spells additional adverse604
shock may occur. However, it is the combination of these risks together with the policy-rate605
smoothing parameter that causes monetary policy to have significant volatility effects and not606
the shock per-se. When these two conditions pre-exist, only then the Epstein-Zin preferences607
play a significant role.608
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Table 2: Disaster Statistics
Metrics Data 1 Standard Deviation 2 Standard Deviation
Probability 7.83 0.30 4.55
Size 21.99 11.84 14.46
Duration 3.72 6.35 3.76
Notes: The data disaster statistic estimates are those reported by Petrosky-Nadeau et al. (2018) (Table 4, pp.
2227). Starting from the stochastic steady state, the model is simulated for 50000 periods. Similar to Petrosky-
Nadeau et al. (2018) , we time-aggregate output into annual observations, and apply the peak-to-trough method
to identify disasters as cumulative fractional declines in output of at least 10%. The disaster probabilities and






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Impulse response to a monetary policy shock from the benchmark and restricted
models
Notes: The light shaded area is the 68% error band while the dark shaded area is the 90% error band from
the benchmark model. The thick black line shows the median response from the restricted model.
39
Figure 5: Downward Risk
Panel A: 1 Standard Deviation Shocks
Panel B: 2 Standard Deviation Shocks
Notes: Starting from the stochastic steady state, the model is simulated for 50000 periods. The histogram
illustrates the distribution of xt as deviation from its stochastic steady-state. Unemployment and inflation are
expressed in percentage points (x-axis), expected unemployment duration is measured in quarters, while the
GDP and labour income are defined as percentage deviations.
40
Figure 6: Search and Matching Frictions
Panel A: Impulse Responses
Panel B: Uncertainty Contribution
Notes: The blue solid (Panel A) and blue circle (Panel B) line (left y-axis) represents the benchmark version
of the model (u = 5.8% or QU = 63%), while the red dashed (Panel A) and red cross (Panel B) line (right
y-axis) is the responses of the model when the unemployment rate is set to (almost) zero or the probability of
finding a job is (almost) one (u = 0 or QU = 100%). Rates are reported in annual basis points, inflation in
annual percentage rates, the job filling probability in percentage points, unemployment duration in quarters.
The responses are calculated relative to the stochastic steady state. Panel B: The uncertainty contribution is
defined as the difference between the response derived by using the third minus the responses produced using
only the first order solution of the model.
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Figure 7: Policy Rate Smoothing Preferences
Panel A: Impulse Responses
Panel B: Uncertainty Contribution
Notes: The blue solid (Panel A) and blue circle (Panel B) line (left y-axis) represents the benchmark version
of the model (ρR = 0.71), while the red dashed (Panel A) and red cross (Panel B) line (right y-axis) denotes
the responses of the model when the interest rate smoothing parameter is set to zero (ρR = 0). Rates are
reported in annual basis points, inflation in annual percentage rates, the job filling probability in percentage
points, unemployment duration in quarters. The responses are calculated relative to the stochastic steady state.
Panel B: The uncertainty contribution is defined as the difference between the response derived by using the
third minus the responses produced using only the first order solution of the model.
42
Figure 8: Epstein-Zin Risk Coefficient
Panel A: Impulse Responses
Panel B: Uncertainty Contribution
Notes: The blue solid (Panel A) and blue circle (Panel B) line (left y-axis) represents the benchmark version
of the model (γ = 115.6), while the red dashed (Panel A) and red cross (Panel B) line (right y-axis) denotes the
responses of the model when the Epstein-Zin Risk Coefficient is set to zero (γ = 0). Rates are reported in annual
basis points, inflation in annual percentage rates, the job filling probability in percentage points, unemployment
duration in quarters. The responses are calculated relative to the stochastic steady state. Panel B: The
uncertainty contribution is defined as the difference between the response derived by using the third minus the
responses produced using only the first order solution of the model.
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